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Abstract
The vast majority of North America’s professional sport arenas, ballparks, and stadiums are
publicly subsidized without direct approval from voters. In this article, we examine the
discursive constitution of ‘no-vote subsidies’ within the public sphere, and in particular
problematize the twinned production(s) of citizenship and democratic process in framing public
subsidization of these sites of private accumulation. To do this, we examine the recent no-vote
subsidy occurring in Columbus, Ohio—thereby providing context-specific interrogation of the
mediations of participatory citizenship, political decision-making, and the institution of
democracy as related to sport stadium funding. As part of this analysis, we discuss the public
production of civic paternalism—a political ideology focused on urban growth and unconcerned
with future electoral consequences—in the Columbus arena financing case. We conclude the
article with a call for increasing scholarly engagement in, and intervention into, the political
processes that result in the public subsidization of professional sport venues.
Keywords: public policy, political science, public subsidies, sport finance, democratic theory
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Framing democracy: Stadium financing and civic paternalism in Test Market, USA
In the late 1990s, policymakers in New York City were considering options for a new
publicly financed ballpark to be built in the city’s Manhattan or Bronx boroughs. Acknowledging
the likelihood that public financing for the new facility would be unpopular among voters, thenmayor Rudolph Giuliani argued against, and subsequently vetoed, a City Council plan to hold a
referendum:
A local law that would place a referendum on the ballot and ask voters of the city to
decide whether public money can be spent on a new stadium in Manhattan would
unjustifiably eliminate a viable option that could potentially insure that the Yankees
remain in New York City. (as quoted in Ravo 1998, B3)
Giuliani’s allusion to an ‘unjustifiable’ process—a concern of many policymakers wherever new
arenas, ballparks, and stadiums (all of which are hereafter referred to as stadiums) are being
considered—suggests that a public vote might have jeopardized local and state governments’
ability to set the conditions upon which stadium financing arrangements are made. The argument
made by Giuliani and other public officials is thus: by proscribing public votes—through
initiatives or referendums—city leaders can avoid confronting the possibility that local citizens
are largely unsupportive of stadium subsidies.
This line of political thinking suggests that by electing individuals to office, voters are
entrusting them to make often difficult—and sometimes unpopular—decisions that will benefit
the community as a whole. Such an ideology typifies what has been referred to as civic
paternalism, a political decision-making strategy informed by a trustee-based philosophy of
representation and the conviction that economic growth is best for the community (Dean 2006;
Kellison and Mondello 2014). Civically paternalistic leaders like Giuliani assert that projects that
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create jobs, stimulate business, and foster city pride are worthy of public subsidization, even if
most citizens disagree.
An alternative to receiving public funding for professional sport venues—whether after a
public vote or via a no-vote subsidy—is, of course, exit, or a team relocating. The North
American sports fan (and those elsewhere) is well versed in this interplay of capital and
governance. Underlining the words of Giuliani, ‘that could potentially insure that the Yankees
remain in New York City,’ is the notion that a team can leave and will leave if not given the
support organizational leaders, usually ownership, feels they deserve. One can turn, for example,
toward the recent attempt by several NFL teams’ interest in moving to Los Angeles and Las
Vegas. The St. Louis Rams (who legally do not need a public vote for securing public funds
toward building a new stadium), Oakland Raiders, and San Diego Chargers all demanded
substantial contributions from the local tax base through threats to leave for Los Angeles (Dillon
2015; Hunn 2015; Knoblauch 2015; Logan 2015). Even after the team was offered a $1.1-billion
stadium (of which $400 million were public funds) to stay in St. Louis, the Rams elected to
relocate (Hunn 2016). As of summer 2016, the Raiders and Chargers are lobbying for new
stadiums in Las Vegas and San Diego, respectively (Showley and Weisberg 2016; Velotta 2016).
These cases exemplify the threat (and occasional reality) of exit.
As Hirschman’s (1978) essay on exit and voice detailed, competitiveness drives the
possibility of exit and privileges the voice of the individual, state, or organization with capital. It
is the threat of capital and capital capacities leaving or ‘exiting’ that drives these conversations.
Therefore, in cities across North America, policymakers commonly pledge their support for
public stadium subsidization without the consent of the citizenry. In fact, of the 50 professional
sport facilities (i.e., across MLB, MLS, the NBA, the NFL, and the NHL) receiving public
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funding since 2005, only eight received approvals through citizen vote. The remaining 42
stadiums—cases of the so-called ‘no-vote subsidy’—represent a public cost of over $8.3 billion
(Sport and Urban Policy Initiative 2016). Included in this number are 16 new or renovated
facilities slated to open between 2016 and 2019, only three of which have been subject to an
initiative or referendum.
This no-vote stadium financing phenomenon has been met with criticism by those who
have pointed out that publicly-funded stadiums have failed to generate significant economic
benefits for their cities (cf. Kellison 2013). Instead, they can create issues of gentrification
(Baade and Dye 1988; Chapin 2004; Spirou 2010; Whitson and Macintosh 1996) and
opportunity costs associated with defunding schools, police, and other public agencies (Eisinger
2000; Howard and Crompton 2013; Siegfried and Zimbalist 2000) while serving to redistribute
public assets to private capital (Delaney and Eckstein 2003; Jones 2002; Rosentraub, Swindell,
Przyblyski, and Mullins 1994; Thornley 2002). In the academy, scholars from sport management
(Kellison and Mondello 2014), urban and regional planning (Chapin 2004), and the sociology of
sport (Bélanger 2000; Friedman and Andrews 2011; Friedman, Andrews, and Silk 2004;
Friedman and Mason 2004; Smith and Ingham 2003) have offered more empirically-grounded
analyses of the negative effects of no-vote stadium financing schematics.
In this article, we add to this literature by considering how stadium financing politics are
framed within the public sphere—and how these mediations create conditions of emergence from
which members of the public become stakeholders in publicly-funded sports stadia. Thinking
back to Giuliani’s dictum, we argue that such civic paternalism is grounded in the belief that
public opinion is inconsequential to urban planning and public-finance decisions and that there is
a prioritization of organizational capital assets that benefit local politicians and business owners
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over the voice of the people as played out through the threat of exit. An underlying theme of this
paper is to consider when—if ever—the tools of direct democracy should be accessible to
citizens. To empiricize the concerns raised above, we focus our analysis on one of the most
recent cases of the no-vote subsidy—Columbus, Ohio—a city historically opposed to public
stadium financing. Columbus, often referred to as ‘Test Market, USA’1 due to a long history of
product testing in the market (which is attributed to the city’s central geographic location and
nation-representative demographic, socioeconomic, and culture profile), provides an important
case for examining how private sport firms and public intermediaries produce not only the
conditions of consent and the makings of stakeholdership through public discourse, but in so
doing also re-constitute the very makings of democratic process.
Arena financing in Columbus, Ohio
We begin by describing the plan for the public acquisition of Nationwide Arena (PANA
Plan), the city’s downtown multipurpose facility, and the development of the surrounding Arena
District. This information is imperative because it helps explain the unique context on which this
paper is focused. Next, we offer an historical review of the city’s previous direct-democracy
votes related to stadium financing. Finally, we detail the terms of the PANA Plan, including the
rationale given by policymakers for the public’s involvement and the process through which the
plan was approved.
Nationwide Arena and the Arena District
Downtown Columbus once bustled with residential interest and economic activity (Curry,
Schwirian, and Woldoff 2004). However, this prosperity dissipated rapidly beginning in the
1960s, decreasing from a peak of 29,845 downtown residents to less than 3,500 in 2000
(Columbus Downtown Development Corporation 2015). According to Curry, Schwirian, and
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Woldoff (2004), two factors led to the downtown exodus. First, the suburbanization of shopping,
prompted by population growth in the city’s outskirts, created competition with the downtown’s
commercial options. Second, the completion of a freeway system that included the Route 270
outerbelt made travel between downtown and the suburbs more viable.
Although several previous attempts to build a downtown arena had been unsuccessful
(highlighted below), Curry, Schwirian, and Woldoff (2004) credited the eventual development of
the arena and surrounding entertainment district to the city officials’ desires to restore the
downtown area to what it had been in the 1950s and 1960s:
The socioeconomic position of [downtown residents] had slipped and could no longer
support the economy that it once had. Also, physical decay was evident in many innercity neighborhood areas, thereby making them unnerving, scary areas at night. The
downtown was no longer the first choice for recreating and relaxing. Indeed, downtown
Columbus seemed like a ghost town at night. It was this decline that eventually led to the
push for downtown urban redevelopment and ultimately to the arena issue. (47)
Planning culminated in a vote in 1997, when Franklin County residents defeated Issue 1, a
proposition to raise the sales tax over three years to pay for a stadium project. Had this plan
passed, the sales-tax revenues would have been used to build a multipurpose arena that came
with the promise of an NHL expansion franchise. The electoral defeat was the latest in a series of
public stadium votes, all of which were defeated by Franklin County voters (outlined in Table 1).
[Table 1 about here]
A day after voters rejected Issue 1, the Columbus Dispatch called the outcome ‘a shame’
based on the assumption all hope was lost for a downtown arena and hockey team. Despite their
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frustration, the Dispatch staff nevertheless recognized the voting outcome as the latest
expression of the will of Franklin County residents:
Over the last two decades, five variations of an arena, convention center and stadium
proposals have been put before city and county voters. All have been defeated, and only
one issue was close. Yesterday, Franklin County voters again spoke with a loud voice.
…Although The Dispatch considers the election outcome a loss for the community, the
vote represents a clear and convincing expression of its judgment. (‘Down for the Count’
1997, 8A)
The seemingly obvious outcome of the vote was that the city’s hope of being awarded an NHL
franchise was lost, as the Dispatch editorial continued: ‘What happens next? There’s no Plan B.
Columbus just rejected a chance for a National Hockey League team. The NHL now will expand
elsewhere and no other league will look at this market when so many others are willing to join in
public–private ventures’ (8a). Three days after the vote, however, the NHL postponed its
expansion announcement to allow Columbus to identify financing alternatives. Less than a
month after Issue 1 was rejected, Mayor Greg Lashutka and the Columbus city council approved
a proposal to privately fund a downtown multipurpose arena (Futty 1997a). On June 25, 1997,
the NHL announced Columbus was among the four cities awarded new hockey franchises (Futty
1997b). The final cost of Nationwide Arena was $150 million, and the 18,500-seat arena opened
in 2000 (Wright 1999).
The public purchase of Nationwide Arena
The plight of the Blue Jackets
Within the last several years, concern has grown over the competitive and financial
solvency of the Columbus Blue Jackets, the city’s pro hockey franchise and primary tenant of
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Nationwide Arena. Prior to the arena’s public purchase, the team had made only one playoff
appearance, and in the 2010–11 season, season-ticket sales decreased by 25% and average
seating capacity filled dropped below 80% (Reed 2011). In addition to the declining attendance,
fans’ growing frustration was being expressed in other ways. For example, on the day the league
office announced Nationwide Arena would host the 2013 NHL All-Star Game,2 250 fans
protested Blue Jackets’ management in front of the arena (Hunter 2012).
Reports from the Columbus Dispatch indicated team owners had seen a significant
depreciation of their capital assets, including $80 million between 2002 and 2009 and $25
million in the 2010–11 season alone (Caruso 2011a; Portzline 2011). In 2009, the Columbus
Chamber of Commerce commissioned a study by Professor Stephen A. Buser to analyse the
economic sustainability of the Blue Jackets. While praising the private developers for the
progress they had made with the Arena District, he also warned that drastic measures were
needed to maintain the team’s viability (Buser 2009).
The primary challenge for Blue Jackets management was the terms of their agreement
with Nationwide Arena. Teams competing in publicly owned facilities are typically offered
generous lease terms, including a low cost of rent and entitlement to some, if not all, of parking,
naming-rights, luxury box, and concessions revenues (Long 2005). However, because
Nationwide Realty owned the arena and the Blue Jackets had little negotiating power,
Nationwide had the upper hand (Hunter 2011). As a result of the unfavourable lease, the Blue
Jackets were required to pay $5 million annually in rent, whereas other NHL teams paid much
lower rents, if any at all. Additionally, unlike most other NHL teams, the Blue Jackets were
charged with managing the arena, costing the team another $4 to $5 million annually. Many
pundits argued that these expenditures—unique in the NHL context to the Blue Jackets—put the
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team at a competitive disadvantage in retaining elite, high-salaried players relative to other teams
in the league (Caruso 2011a).
Noting that other cities were seeking NHL franchises and building similar arena
developments, Buser (2009) emphasized that a timely solution was necessary. With the Blue
Jackets’ finances in dire straits, the local media began to raise concerns that the team would
relocate to another city. The city and county had a direct financial stake in neither the Blue
Jackets nor Nationwide Arena; however, losing the team could mean the loss of jobs along with
the primary tenant of the arena (Arace 2011). The loss of the Blue Jackets could trickle down to
other businesses in the Arena District, creating a disastrous snowball effect.
In spite of seemingly inadequate consumer interest and a lack of solvent revenue rates, in
September 2011, the Franklin County Convention Facilities Authority (FCCFA) announced a
preliminary agreement to secure the Blue Jackets’ presence in Columbus until at least 2039
(Caruso 2011a). The PANA Plan called for the FCCFA (acting on the behalves of the city and
county) to purchase Nationwide Arena, while Nationwide would purchase an ownership share of
the team. Though portrayed above as a relatively straightforward agreement, the PANA Plan
involves a complex set of arrangements. In the following section, the terms of the plan, including
the sources for public financing, are detailed.
Financing details of the sale
The PANA Plan emerged from a joint partnership between Columbus city and Franklin
County officials. As noted in a report filed by the partnership, a working committee of seven
individuals was formed to address the arena situation. The membership included: Mayor Michael
B. Coleman; his chief of staff, Michael D. Reese; City Council President Andrew J. Ginther;
City Auditor Hugh J. Dorrian; Franklin County Commissioner John O’Grady; County

10
Administrator Don L. Brown; and Executive Director of the FCCFA, William C. Jennison. The
group created a finance subcommittee. The subcommittee was tasked with developing a
financially viable proposal that would protect the long-term health of the Arena District while
adhering to the working committee’s transaction principles. These principles included using
casino tax revenues rather than tapping into the city and county’s general funds; making no
payments to the Blue Jackets for past losses; obtaining significant investments from the private
sector; and maintaining an existing agreement in which Nationwide made contributions to
Columbus Public Schools (City of Columbus 2011b).
Their efforts resulted in the Columbus PANA Plan, in which Nationwide Arena would be
purchased by the FCCFA (representing the city and county) for $42.5 million. When accounting
for arena upgrades and projected operating (e.g., utilities, maintenance and janitorial service,
game day personnel; Greenberg 2000) and capital expenditures (e.g., scoreboard upgrades; Bell
2012), the total cost of the transaction would be $53.3 million. The city’s and county’s payment
obligations would be repaid using casino-generated tax revenue.
When the FCCFA’s plan to buy Nationwide Arena surfaced, public response to the deal
varied. While many expressed relief that the downtown arena’s anchor resident would stay in
Columbus, others showed concern about the decision to spend public money without voter
approval, especially considering city and county voters’ historic resistance to stadium subsidies
(Caruso 2012; Tussel 2011). In acknowledgement of these concerns, city auditor Hugh Dorrian
contended, ‘There’s a fundamental difference between [past] attempts and this attempt: Those
called for an increase in taxes’ (as quoted in Caruso 2011a, 1A). Dispatch sports columnist Bob
Hunter (2011) also emphasized that the current plan was unlike previous proposals:
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You shouldn’t have to be a hockey fan to see what the Blue Jackets have done for the
city, and it has nothing to do with winning and losing. …It bothers me that some people
still seem to be wearing their vote against the arena when it was on the ballot as a badge
of honor, as if they still have no concept what the franchise has done for the community.
They got an arena that was privately financed—good for them—but apparently don’t
want to admit they had benefitted from it. (1C)
The most vocal opposition to the deal came from challengers to incumbent elected officials,
including Earl Smith, Republican challenger to then three-term mayor Michael B. Coleman
(Caruso 2011c). Smith denounced the plan, arguing that public money should instead be spent
responding to housing issues and preventing crime (Caruso 2011d). Another opponent of the
arena deal was Matt Ferris, a Republican running for city council in the 2011 election. Ferris was
ejected from the city council’s meeting to vote on the arena deal after his request to speak at the
meeting was rejected, as per meeting procedures. During the incident, he argued, ‘You take two
years to put together a backroom deal and then two weeks to talk about it. I’m sorry, but you’re
spineless. And you’re a crook because you’re taking my tax dollars’ (as quoted in Caruso 2011b,
1A).
On October 3, 2011, the Columbus city council approved the purchase of Nationwide
Arena. Six council members affirmed the motion, while the seventh, Zachary Klein, abstained
because of his law firm’s involvement in the deal (Caruso 2011b; City of Columbus 2011a).
When explaining his support for the deal, city council president Andrew Ginther noted, ‘We
cannot in this environment stand by and not do everything we can to protect jobs and build [an]
environment for jobs to be created in the future’ (as quoted in Trimble 2011a, para. 3). Then, on

12
December 19, Franklin County’s three commissioners gave unanimous approval (Trimble
2011b). The purchase closed on March 28, 2012 (Caruso 2012).
While it is important to acknowledge that the PANA Plan did not include a regressive-tax
increase like what had been proposed in Franklin County’s previous stadium-financing
referendums, the allocation of casino-generated tax monies toward the purchase of Nationwide
Arena nonetheless involved significant opportunity costs to county residents. Opportunity costs
are the costs borne by other programs and projects (such as education, welfare, infrastructure,
and civil services) that could have been funded with the money earmarked for the arena
financing (Eisinger 2000; Howard and Crompton 2013). For example, city officials estimated
that in 2014, over $7.7 million of casino-generated revenues would be used for arena
expenditures and servicing the state and private loans; this total amounted to 25% of the total
projected casino taxes (City of Columbus 2011b). After three years, the share of the casino
revenues directed toward the arena would increase in 1% increments before capping at 32%,
thereby increasing the opportunity costs.
Thus, in lieu of utilizing the tools of direct democracy, Columbus city councilmembers
and Franklin County commissioners elected to unilaterally adopt the PANA Plan. This decisionmaking process contradicts past stadium-financing procedures in Franklin County. Next, we
theorize that decision-makers involved in no-vote subsidy policymaking substantiated their
actions based on a civically paternalistic mind set.
Civic paternalism, initiatives and referendums, and representative democracy
In this section, we discuss in further depth two forms of democracy: representative
democracy and direct democracy. Rosenthal (1998), invoking Anthony King’s scholarship,
discussed two models of the legislative branch. In the first, labelled as the division of labour, the
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governor and the governed stand on opposing sides of decision making. Governors consider what
they believe is best when making decisions, but do not need to show concern for what the
governed believe. In the second model, agency, the elected representative must respond to what
the constituents desire. Alternatively, in direct democracy, there is no need for an intermediary;
instead, citizens vote directly on all governmental issues.
The term ‘representative’ has itself carried different connotations throughout history.
Eulau, Wahlke, Buchanan, and Ferguson (1959) suggest that representative simply means an
official elected by modes of popular election. If the people elected begin making decisions that
many disagree with, then they are said to be unresponsive, thereby contributing to the so-called
‘democratic deficit’ (Lax and Phillips 2011). Rosenthal (1998) observed that citizens in America
feel as though they have lost control of their country, while Dalton, Burklin, and Drummond
(2001) noted that in the last 25 years of the Twentieth Century, there was a strong sentiment for
moving toward a more direct democracy because individuals did not believe they were being
engaged in the process of decision making. Thus, there has been ever decreasing numbers of
voters turning out to vote. While this is not in and of itself enough of a reason to abandon
representative democracy, it does indicate a disconnect and lays to bare a problem with
representative theory in general. That is, representative elections have not yielded representative
decisions—partially at the fault of the voter (Dalton, Burklin, and Drummond 2001). While this
tearing away from a truly representative structure is based on multiple factors, it remains
applicable here.
Scherer and Sam (2008) argued that most public stadiums are built today without public
consultation, and at times, against the will of the people. Therefore, representative democracy in
these cases fail. In these instances, decisions are made with a focus on helping the business elite
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and with a belief that bringing in large money from outside visitors and investors will improve
lives. However, as Scherer and Sam have argued, these decisions are often focused heavily on
pro-business interests that favour capitalist elites.
According to Molotch (1999), the local elites rule civic politics based on their high levels
of influence: ‘The role of the local rentier elite links daily life and mundane local politics, on the
one hand, to the larger economic and political structures of constraint and support, on the other’
(248). Most policymakers would likely take exception to Molotch’s argument that the growth
machine targets only a small number of benefactors (Curry, Schwirian, and Woldoff 2004).
Instead, civic leaders supporting a local growth agenda might argue that the city’s economic
security and growth (though chiefly benefiting an urban growth regime) trickle down to all
citizens, thereby benefitting the entire community. In general, the voting public tends to support
developmental policies designed to generate positive economic benefits (as opposed to
allocational or redistributive policies; Peterson 1981). As a result of this preference, city leaders
normally back professional sports and stadiums ‘as instruments of economic development and
affirmations of the importance of their city or metropolitan area’ (Danielson 1997, 15).
Indeed, the promise of growth was an important part of the Franklin County
policymakers’ rationalization for the PANA Plan. Based on testimony appearing in the local
press, the city and county officials who approved the financing plan were cognizant of the fact
that some citizens would be opposed to the stadium subsidy (e.g., Caruso and Bush 2011). For
example, during the public comments that preceded the city council vote, an Ohio State law
student argued, ‘There’s two problems with this deal. The first is democracy, and second is this
is a bad deal’ (as quoted in Pioterek 2011, para. 3).3 This concern was echoed by a resident of
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Columbus’s East Side: ‘What we’re talking about is small ‘d’ in democracy. The people should
be able to vote on this’ (as quoted in Trimble 2011a, para. 11).
If we are to consider a representative democracy, direct citizen votes are not wholly
contradictory to the philosophies of representative governance (Cronin 1989). Both the tools of
direct democracy and the representative system are complementary. However, critics might ask
how to differentiate issues requiring voter consent from issues better decided by elected officials.
Opinions about the reach of government vary greatly across political philosophies. Still, even
among advocates of small-government ideologies (such as some forms of classical liberalism or
what is more commonly referred to by critics today as ‘neoliberalism’; e.g., Coakley 2011; Hall
2006; Newman and Giardina 2011; Silk and Andrews 2012), the government plays a role in
society (Spragens 1999).4 This burgeoning (neo)liberal ethos, by no means unique to Columbus
or even the contemporary United States, is grounded on the assumption that government
involvement should be isolated to the programs and services that benefit society but are
otherwise unprofitable.
As a political strategy, civically paternalistic decisions may be met with opposition from
the polity. After all, the policies that best serve the community might not be the most popular
(Fox and Shotts 2009). As Danielson noted, however, there have historically been little political
consequences for elected officials voting in favour of stadium subsidies: ‘…Few if any elections
for public office have been fought on sports issues’ (Danielson 1997, 270). At the surface, the
lack of political consequences suggests voters support public stadium subsidies, or at least the
policymakers who provide the subsidies. But some previous research on stadium referendums
and urban growth coalitions portray community members as unaware of the stadium issue or shut
out of the democratic process (Brown and Paul 2002; Curry, Schwirian, and Woldoff 2004;
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Delaney and Eckstein 2003). In either case, an active and engaged citizenry—a fundamental
aspect of the American democracy—is not being fully realized (Held 2006).
Civic paternalism as public policy in Columbus
Although Franklin County residents were not afforded the opportunity to vote for the
PANA Plan, the elected and appointed officials involved in the development and institution of
the Nationwide Arena deal publicly postulated concern for the public good when arriving at their
decision. The PANA Plan, policymakers argued, was necessary in order to save thousands of
jobs and to continue downtown Columbus’s economic growth, both of which would directly or
indirectly benefit residents: county commissioner John O’Grady expressed his support of ‘deals
that are about job creation and retention’ (as quoted in Caruso 2011a, 1A), while city council
president Andrew Ginther argued a proposed ballot issue designed to terminate the plan ‘would
threaten 10,000 jobs’ (as quoted in Sullivan 2014a, 1B).
Based on scientific polling of registered voters conducted in Franklin County during the
arena financing debate, it appears that voters might have endorsed the plan at the ballots. As
shown in Table 2, a majority of survey respondents expressed some degree of support for the use
of casino-generated revenues to purchase Nationwide Arena.
[Table 2 near here]
Considering the hypothetical nature of the items responded to by the survey respondents, it is
impractical to predict with certainty the outcome of a PANA Plan vote. Regardless, in the mind
of the civically paternalistic leader, such information may be superfluous (e.g., Kellison &
Mondello, 2014). These policymakers subscribed to a trustee form of representation, in which
elected officials have ‘an electoral incentive to use [their] expertise and pursue policies that [they
believe] promote the general welfare’ (Fox and Shotts 2009, 1225). On the other hand, delegate-
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minded elected officials are politically motivated to govern in ways that match the public will,
regardless of their personal expertise. Though civic paternalism is more closely aligned with
trustee representation, civic paternalism is unique because the electoral consequences of a
civically paternalistic decision are supposedly ignored by policymakers, whereas trustees
promote their policies because they are electorally incentivized to do so (Bengtsson and Wass
2010; Fox and Shotts 2009).
Policymakers acknowledged that regardless of the specifics of the PANA Plan, some
voters would always demand that casino revenues be directed toward other city priorities like
schools, infrastructure, and civil services. In light of these concerns, policymakers noted that
investing in an economic engine like Nationwide Arena would generate new income to be used
for other programs and projects (Caruso and Bush 2011). Such a rationale is emblematic of civic
paternalism: while aware of opposing viewpoints and the potential political consequences of an
unpopular decision, civically paternalistic leaders nevertheless utilize their own expertise to
govern in ways they believe best serve the collective. In this case, that meant securing the Arena
District’s long-term viability.
Discussion
There is little evidence to suggest the stadium-financing plan in Columbus negatively
influenced citizens’ attitudes toward democracy and voting. Given the large number of no-vote
subsidies that have been awarded throughout North America in the past decade, however, it is
likely that at least some cases involve public-financing decisions that would not have been
supported in a public vote. With respect to such cases, there are several possible means to
reincorporate the public will into political policymaking.
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First, citizen- or policymaker-led initiatives may be proposed to require that a public vote
be held in any instance a stadium subsidy is proposed, or to prohibit public-stadium financing
altogether. Such legislation is plausible at all levels of government. Locally, citizens might
canvas and petition to amend a city ordinance. At the state and federal levels, legislators could
propose constitutional amendments to ban tax-exempt bonds for stadiums. Although previous
attempts to pass legislation have failed to gain traction at the federal level, local citizen-led
initiatives may be more successful. In response to the PANA Plan, in late 2013, a grassroots
organization known as the Columbus Coalition for Responsive Government initiated an
amendment that would block public payments to Nationwide Arena beginning in 2016. This
amendment, which would be subject to a public vote, would effectively repeal the PANA Plan.
However, their petition was rejected by the Franklin County Board of Elections because it
contained ‘misleading language that might have swayed people who signed them’ (Sullivan
2014b, 1A).
Perhaps the most effective strategy for reducing the likelihood of nondemocratic
policymaking is for citizens to engage in retroactive voting (Fox and Shotts 2009). In retroactive
voting, citizens consider an incumbent’s record in office rather than the politician’s future
platform when deciding whether to re-elect. Although retroactive voting has rarely been
employed in past cases of unpopular stadium subsidies (e.g., Carr 2009; Danielson 1997), the
recent recall of Miami mayor Carlos Alvarez illustrates its potential utility (Haggman and
Brannigan 2011). As part of a well-financed campaign against Alvarez, a minute-long video
reminded voters that Alvarez allocated $370 million in public subsidies toward Marlins Ballpark
without holding a public vote (‘Reason #3’ 2011). Miami-Dade County voters overwhelmingly
supported the removal of Alvarez (88.1% of voters favoured the recall) in the largest municipal
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recall in U.S. history (Haggman and Brannigan 2011; Miami-Dade County Elections Department
2011). More recently, a runoff election between Cobb County, Georgia, Commission chairperson
Tim Lee and challenger Mike Boyce was called ‘a delayed stadium referendum’ based on Lee’s
support of a $376-million no-vote subsidy for a new Atlanta Braves ballpark (Klepal 2016). The
new stadium, set to open in suburban Cobb in 2017, will replace Turner Field, the Braves’
downtown stadium that first opened for baseball in 1997. Lee has been criticized for the lack of
public input and transparency surrounding the plan (Kimes 2015), and exit polling from the
Republican primary election indicated the ‘stadium issue was indeed the primary issue that
decided four out of five ballots’ (Klepal 2016, B1, B4).
Returning to the Columbus PANA Plan, there remains little reason to suspect that voters
would have rejected a plan to purchase Nationwide Arena using tax revenues generated from the
local casino. In fact, several pieces of evidence suggest the opposite is true. First, a majority of
poll respondents viewed the financing plan favourably (see Table 2). Additionally, there did not
appear to be any adverse retroactive voting in the elections that immediately followed the
passing of the PANA Plan. Since the arena-financing vote, all three Franklin County
commissioners retained their seats: in 2012, John O’Grady ran unopposed and Paula Brooks won
with 64% of the vote, while in 2014, Marilyn Brown ran unopposed (Franklin County Board of
Elections 2012). Five of the seven city councilmembers from the PANA Plan remained in office,
while one was elected to the Ohio House of Representatives and another resigned to take a
position in the private sector (Sullivan 2014c).
Assuming voters in Franklin County would have passed the PANA Plan, did the
policymakers’ no-vote subsidy save everyone the time and resources associated with deliberating
over a seemingly uncontested issue? There are a number of ways to answer this question, none of
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which provide a fully satisfying response. As we have noted previously, some would argue the
outcome (i.e., PANA Plan) was less important than the process (i.e., public vote), and therefore,
a public vote was necessary in order to maintain an actively engaged and represented citizenry.
Others might argue that of the indicators of PANA Plan support described in the previous
paragraph, only one was known at the time the issue was voted on by policymakers. Still others
might suggest, following a neoclassical (or neoliberal) line of thinking, that in any case of public
investment in a project that will result in profit for private entities, public approval (expressed in
a vote) should be required.
Conclusion
Pubic discourse on public-stadium financing in the US has been relatively static since the
issue first surfaced in the 1950s. A professional sports team may or may not produce tangible
and intangible benefits for a city, owners may or may not be able to afford a state-of-the-art
stadium of their own, and the citizenry—including consumers and non-consumers of sport—may
or may not suffer without a sports team. Given that exit is always possible in the professional
team sport market, it should not be surprising that in local contexts these discussions continue to
stimulate speculation of teams exiting a city. Historically speaking, these debates typically
culminate in a vote by citizens, who have the final say over whether public-tax dollars are
awarded to a stadium project (Kellison and Mondello 2014). However, as highlighted throughout
this article, the decision to allocate public financing is almost never made directly by citizens
anymore, but rather, a handful of elected policymakers. Some have argued that as it is, the novote subsidy might not be that highly problematic; after all, voters elect leaders to make
decisions on their behalf.
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But, what happens if the public will is not reflected by policies and legislation?
Furthermore, how is the public will even assessed? What happens if a policy is proposed to
extend public benefits to private enterprise? Even more generally, does the exclusion of the
public in the decision-making process counter the spirit of democracy? If not, how do citizens
engage in the democratic process (cf. Porter and Sam 2013; Sam and Scherer 2010; Scherer and
Sam 2010)? Finally, when it comes to controversial decisions, how do policymakers defend their
actions? This paper represents an initial effort to address these questions.
Policymakers in Columbus, Ohio, acknowledged the possibility that their decision to
purchase the city’s downtown multipurpose arena with casino-generated revenues could
contradict the public will. This admission was reconciled by a belief in a form of democratic
representation known as civic paternalism, in which policymakers rely on their own expertise
and judgment rather than the perceived public preference. Here, the disjunction between public
discourse (i.e., citizen opposition to the financing plan) and policymaker practice (i.e., passing
the financing plan) is facilitated by civic paternalism. That is, gaps exist between the story being
told—a story whose authority the language of civic paternalism serves to protect—and the reality
of the no-vote subsidy.
By limiting individual involvement in the decision-making process, the no-vote subsidy
is inconsistent with the argument that a democracy should consist of an active and engaged
citizenry (Greaves 2004). But as a tool of public policymaking, the no-vote subsidy is not an
unlawful form of governance. In this article, we have portrayed the no-vote subsidy as a
potentially serious issue that had failed to garner the attention of the academy. Future efforts to
study the sociopolitical implications of civic paternalism and the no-vote subsidy should come
from many directions and rely on a variety of methodologies. Such diverse approaches are
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necessary if the controversies surrounding public-stadium finance and the American democracy
are to be studied in earnest.
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Table 1: Summary of Previous Arena Financing Issues in Franklin County
Year
1978

Approve
N
%
33,279 35.0

Reject
N
%
61,917 65.0

Issue
$29,500,000 in bonds issued; increase in property
tax over 20 years estimated to be $.075 per $100
1981 .50% increase in city income tax over one year
27,730 21.4 101,821 78.6
1986 .50% increase in county sales and use tax over 10
81,912 46.6 94,051 53.4
years
1987 .25% increase in county sales and use tax over eight
94,106 43.8 120,827 56.2
years
1997 .50% increase in county sales and use tax over three 109,183 43.8 139,997 56.2
years
Note. Figures and issue information obtained from Franklin County Board of Elections, either through
Manager of Election Operations or via http://vote.franklincountyohio.gov/. Majority of votes indicated
in boldface.
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Table 2: Public Support of the PANA Plan
Support of Financing Plan Items
I support the use of casino-generated revenues to buy Nationwide
Arena.
I was in favour of the use of casino-generated money to buy
Nationwide Arena.
Using casino-generated money to buy Nationwide Arena is an idea I
can endorse.
Buying Nationwide Arena using casino-generated revenues was a
favourable plan.

Yes
45.1%

No
Undecided
37.2%
17.7%

37.9%

36.2%

25.9%

44.6%

35.2%

20.2%

39.2%

34.7%

26.2%

Note. N = 401. Yes = composite of strongly agree, agree, and agree somewhat. No = composite of strongly
disagree, disagree, and disagree somewhat. Undecided = neither agree nor disagree.
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1

Columbus is widely considered among market researchers to be made up of an ideal
representative demographic and cultural profile—one that serves as a microcosm of the U.S.
consumer market more generally. In a recent NPR special on Columbus’s longstanding
reputation as a test market, marketing expert Alex Fischer explained: ‘I often say if you raked
America together, you'd find Columbus, you have this interesting blend of a funky culture—
creativity, diversity—and a corporate culture that really mix it up’.
2
A labour dispute in 2013 led to the cancelation of the NHL’s midseason exhibition. Columbus
was subsequently selected as host of the 2015 All-Star Game.
3
The student, Dave Ebersole, later published a paper in Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly,
where he argued that the PANA Plan was unconstitutional (Ebersole 2013).
4
Adam Smith identified three duties of government, including defending against other nations
and protecting citizens from other members of the society. As quoted below, Smith (1776/1904)
also advocated for restricting government involvement to unprofitable services:
The third and last duty of the sovereign or commonwealth is that of erecting and
maintaining those public institutions and those public works, which, though they may be
in the highest degree advantageous to a great society, are, however, of such a nature, that
the profit could never repay the expense to any individual or small number of individuals,
and which it therefore cannot be expected that any individual or small number of
individuals should erect or maintain. (681)

